Opinion: Congress cannot let presidents manufacture war powers

Published 1:30 am Thursday, March 19, 2026

A president launches a war without Congressional approval. Americans are placed in immediate danger. Congress is told it is now too late to act.

That is not a crisis. It is a playbook.

Senator Lisa Murkowski followed it on March 4, voting against even debating an end to President Donald Trump’s Iran war just days after it began. Her justification was straightforward: once Americans are under attack, halting operations would only make them less safe. In that logic, the danger created by unilateral action becomes the reason Congress must stand aside.

On March 16, Murkowski explained her decision in a letter to Alaskans. She opposed Senate Joint Resolution 104, which would have required the withdrawal of U.S. forces from hostilities with Iran absent congressional authorization. The measure came days after Operation Epic Fury began on February 28, when U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted Iran’s military infrastructure, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Iran responded with large-scale retaliation across the region. American servicemembers have been killed. Roughly 50,000 U.S. troops, along with diplomats and civilians, are now within range of further escalation.

Murkowski conceded that the president should have sought authorization before launching such a strike. Yet she argued that once events were in motion, congressional intervention would increase risk. That argument depends on a premise she does not confront: the risks she cites were created by a decision made without Congress.

Follow that logic to its conclusion. A president can initiate hostilities, expose American forces to retaliation, and then invoke that exposure as the reason Congress cannot intervene.

Act first, escalate fast, deter oversight later. What begins as a constitutional violation becomes a strategic advantage.

The presence of 50,000 troops in the region makes the point unmistakable. Their vulnerability is real, but it is not inevitable. It is the result of a unilateral decision. When that vulnerability becomes the argument against congressional action, oversight is no longer a safeguard. It is neutralized.

Murkowski maintains that intervention at that stage would have increased risk. What goes unsaid is that every risk cited stems from bypassing the constitutional process in the first place. Congress is not being asked to choose between safety and danger.

It is being asked to accept that its authority expires once the first strike is launched.

This reasoning reflects a familiar pattern. Do not constrain the commander in chief. Do not send the wrong signal. Do not abandon Americans in harm’s way. The phrases change slightly, but the structure remains: shift the debate from whether a war should begin to whether it can safely be stopped. The answer, almost always, is no.

There is also a clear contradiction. Murkowski’s own letter calls for a time-limited authorization for the use of military force, meaningful constraints, and rigorous oversight. Yet she voted against advancing the only measure before the Senate that would have forced such accountability.

Oversight is acknowledged in principle and deferred in practice.

The implications extend well beyond this conflict.

If Congress accepts this framework, it relinquishes its role in deciding when the nation goes to war. Its function becomes reactive, funding and explaining conflicts after they begin rather than determining whether they should begin at all.

That creates a powerful incentive for presidential overreach. If lawmakers are unlikely to act once Americans are exposed, the fastest way to avoid scrutiny is to expose them quickly. Risk becomes leverage. Escalation becomes insulation.

The constitutional consequences are profound. The framers vested the power to declare war in Congress to prevent exactly this concentration of authority. The president directs military operations, but does not decide alone when to start them. When Congress waits until after hostilities begin and then declares it is too late to act, it is not exercising judgment. It is surrendering it.

If this pattern continues, the shift will not come through formal change but through repetition. Each decision to stand aside reinforces the next. Each conflict becomes precedent for the one that follows.

The question is no longer theoretical. If Congress treats war as a decision it cannot revisit once fighting begins, presidents will ensure that moment comes quickly. Authority will not be debated. It will be bypassed.

Congress can still draw the line where the Constitution places it, before the first strike, before the first escalation, before the first excuse. Or it can continue to explain why that moment has already passed.

Van Abbott is a long-time resident of Alaska and California. He has held financial management positions in government and private organizations, and is now a full-time opinion writer. He served in the late 1960s in the Peace Corps as a teacher.